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Abstract
Recent work by Maddah-Ali and Niesen (2014) introduced coded caching which demonstrated the benefits of joint design
of storage and transmission policies in content delivery networks. They studied a setup where a server communicates with a set
of users, each equipped with a local cache, over a shared error-free link and proposed an order-optimal caching and delivery
scheme. In this paper, we introduce the problem of private coded caching where we impose the additional constraint that a user
should not be able to learn anything, from either the content stored in its cache or the server transmissions, about a file it did
not request. We propose a feasible scheme for this setting and demonstrate its order-optimality by deriving information-theoretic
lower bounds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Broadband data consumption has grown at a rapid pace over last couple of decades, owing in great part to multimedia
applications such as Video-on-Demand [1]. Content delivery networks attempt to mitigate this extra load on the communication
network by deploying storage units or caches where some of the popular content can be pre-fetched during the off-peak hours.
Content caching and delivery has been studied extensively in the literature, see for example [20], [4], [3] and references
therein. However, most of the work proposes caching schemes where those parts of the requested files that are available at
nearby caches are served locally and the remaining parts are served by a remote server via separate unicast transmissions to
the users. In contrast, recent work [10], [11] has studied an information-theoretic formulation of the problem and proposed
the idea of coded caching which uses the available cache memory to not only provide local access to content but to also
generate coded-multicasting opportunities among users with different demands. The setup studied in [10], [11] consists of a
server communicating to a set of users, each equipped with a cache of uniform size, over a broadcast link and the objective
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2is to minimize the worst-case server transmission rate, over all feasible user demands. For this setup, coded caching is shown
to provide significant benefits over traditional caching and delivery, and is in fact within a constant factor of the optimal. In
this work, we consider a similar problem setup where we have the additional constraint that no user should be able to obtain
any information, from its cache content as well as the server transmission, about any file other than the one it has requested.
We call this setup ‘private’ and devise a private coded caching scheme. Since we require that the cache content at each user
not reveal any information about the files, but that along with the server transmission each user be able to reconstruct its
demanded file, our formulation naturally suggests using the idea of secret sharing [6], [17] as part of our solution strategy.
Under secret sharing, a set of ‘shares’ is generated for each file so that the file can be reconstructed if one has access to all
the corresponding shares, but that any subset of the shares of size less than a threshold reveals nothing about the file.
We derive an achievability scheme based on secret sharing. Further, incorporating the condition of privacy on top of the
cut-set based lower bound in [10], we derive a lower bound on the server transmission rate. Comparing the achievable rate
with the derived lower bound, we demonstrate that the performance of our scheme is within a constant factor of the optimal
for several parameter values of interest. For instance, if the number of files is greater than the number of users, our scheme
is order-optimal for all feasible values of cache memory. We refer to Theorem 3 for more details. Following the setting of
[11], we also propose a decentralized variant of our achievability scheme, wherein caching is carried out independently at each
user. This mode of caching allows for varying number of users and for the absence of a centralized coordinating server. The
performance of this decentralized scheme is again shown to be within a constant factor of the optimal.
The results of [10], [11] on coded caching have been extended in several other directions as well, ranging from heterogeneous
cache sizes [19], unequal file sizes [21], to improved converse arguments [2], [7], [16]. Content caching and delivery has also
been studied in the context of device-to-device networks, multi-server topologies, and heterogeneous wireless networks in [9],
[18], and [8] respectively. The work closest to ours is [15], which considers the problem of secure coded caching, where the
goal is to protect information about the files from an eavesdropper which can listen to the server transmissions. However, [15]
does not capture the notion of privacy that we consider here. Throughout the paper, by security / secure we mean protection
against an eavesdropper and by privacy / private we refer to our problem of interest. While most of the work in this paper
focuses on private coded caching, we will also briefly discuss the case where one requires both privacy and security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the problem setup in Section II and present our main results in
Section III. We discuss some examples and then describe our proposed centralized private coded caching scheme in Section IV.
We present converse arguments and prove order-optimality of the proposed scheme in Section V. A decentralized variant of
the proposed scheme is presented in Section VI and we conclude with a discussion of our results in Section VII. A part of this
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Fig. 1. In the setup above, a server containing N files, each of F bits, is connected via an error-free shared link to K users, each with a cache memory of
size MF bits. The server multicasts through this link at a rate of at most RF bits.
work was presented in [13]; this manuscript has the complete proofs of all the results as well as original technical content. In
particular, Section VI is new where we present a decentralized private coded caching scheme where the content placement in
the caches is carried out independently at each user. We further show order-optimality of the proposed decentralized scheme.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Notation: For n ∈ N, we denote by [n] the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. A vector of random variables will be denoted by bold-faced upper
case letters, e.g., Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn). For a set A ⊆ [n], we will denote the vector of random variables indexed by elements
in A by YA. Specifically, if A = {i1, i2, . . . , im} where 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < . . . < im ≤ n, we denote YA = (Yi1 , Yi2 , . . . , Yim).
We consider a single-hop content delivery network, as illustrated in Figure 1. The system consists of a server hosting a
collection of N files, W = (W1,W2, . . . ,WN ), each of size F bits. We will assume that W1,W2, . . . ,WN are independent
random variables each distributed uniformly over [2F ]. The server is connected via a shared, error-free link to K users, each
with a cache memory of size MF bits. We will refer to M as the normalized cache memory size.
The system works in two phases: a placement phase followed by a delivery phase. In the placement phase, the user caches
are populated with content related to the N files using a possibly randomized scheme. Formally, we denote the content stored in
cache k by a random variable Zk which takes values in [2MF ]. The vector Z = (Z1, Z2, . . . , ZK) is jointly distributed according
to some conditional distribution pZ|W. Note that the placement phase is performed without any prior knowledge of future user
demands. During the delivery phase, each user requests one of the N files. The resulting demand vector d = (d1, d2, . . . , dK)
is revealed to all the users and the server. The server transmits a message Xd(W,Z) of size RF bits on the shared link to
the users.
4Each user k generates an estimate Ŵdk of its requested file Wdk using only its stored cache content Zk and the server
transmission Xd(W,Z). The probability of error of a placement and delivery scheme is given by
Pe , max
d∈[N ]K
P
(
(Ŵd1 , . . . , ŴdK ) 6= (Wd1 , . . . ,WdK )
)
, (1)
where the probability is over the files and the randomization in the placement phase, i.e., over the distribution pWpZ|W. Note
that we take the worse-case error probability over all possible demand vectors d. In addition to recovering the demanded
files, we also want each user to not obtain any information about the other files. The information leakage of a placement and
delivery scheme is defined as:
L , max
d∈[N ]K
max
k∈[K]
I(W[N ]\{dk};Xd(W,Z), Zk). (2)
A placement and delivery scheme is said to be an (, δ)-private scheme if its probability of error Pe ≤  and information
leakage L ≤ δ.
Definition 1. The memory-rate pair (M,R) is said to be privately achievable, if for any , δ > 0 and large enough file size
F , there exists an (, δ)-private scheme.
The object of interest in this paper is the optimal server transmission rate R?P (M) for normalized cache memory size M ,
given by
R?P (M) , inf{R : (M,R) is privately achievable}. (3)
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main result of this paper is an approximate characterization of the optimal server transmission rate R?P (M) for any
normalized cache memory size M . We propose a private caching and delivery scheme to show the following upper bound on
R?P (M).
Theorem 1. For M = NtK−t + 1 with t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K − 2}, the following rate is privately achievable
RC(M) ,
K(N +M − 1)
N + (K + 1)(M − 1) . (4)
For M = N(K − 1), we achieve the rate RC(M) = 1. Further, for any general 1 ≤M ≤ N(K − 1), the convex envelope of
these points is achievable.
Some comments are in order. Note that the achievable rate RC(M) = 1 for M = N(K − 1). This is in fact the minimum
achievable rate for any private caching scheme, i.e. R?P (M) ≥ 1, ∀ M . Intuitively, this is because the information leakage
as defined in (2) is constrained to be negligible for any private scheme, and this implies that the contents of a cache cannot
5provide any information about the requested file on its own. Hence, for a user to learn the file it requested, it must receive
from the server at least F bits. We provide a formal proof in Section V. Similarly, note that we only consider M ≥ 1 in the
above result. As we prove in Section V, this is indeed a necessary condition for the existence of a private caching and delivery
scheme.
The next result provides an information-theoretic lower bound on the server transmission rate of any private caching and
delivery scheme.
Theorem 2. For 1 ≤M ≤ N(K − 1),
R?P (M) ≥ max
s∈{1,2,...,min{N/2,K}}
sbN/sc − 1− (s− 1)M
bN/sc − 1 . (5)
The above result is obtained using cut-set based arguments and is presented in section V. The lower bound can be further
improved by using non-cut set based arguments as shown in Section VII. However, the cut-set lower bound is indeed tight
for the case with N = K = 2, as shown in Section IV. This lower bound also suffices to show that, in general, the server
transmission rate of the proposed scheme is within a constant factor of the optimal for most regimes of interest:
Theorem 3. For M ≥M0 , 1 + max
{
0, N(K−N)(N−1)K+N
}
,
1 ≤ RC(M)
R?P (M)
≤ 16. (6)
The above theorem establishes the order-optimality of our scheme. The constant 16 can perhaps be improved using more
sophisticated converse arguments, see, for example, [7], [16].
It is easy to verify that M0 = 1 for N ≥ K. Recall that M ≥ 1 is necessary for any private caching and delivery scheme and
thus our proposed scheme is order-optimal for all permissible values of the normalised cache memory size M . For N < K,
we have M0 ≤ 1+N/(N −1) < 5/2 and thus the above result establishes the order-optimality of our proposed scheme for all
regimes of interest except for 1 ≤ M ≤ 5/2. This limitation is because for N < K, the lower bound in Theorem 2 depends
only on the number of files N . However, we expect the optimal rate to increase with the number of users K, since we have
to ensure privacy for a larger set of users.
We further propose a decentralized variant of our private caching scheme in Section VI and analyze its performance, which
results in the following theorem.
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Fig. 2. Optimal scheme for N = K = 2, M = 1 achieving rate RC = 1. Server transmission for the demand vector (d1, d2) = (1, 2) is shown.
Theorem 4. For M ≥ 1 there exists a decentralized scheme for which the following rate is privately achievable
RD(M) =

K 1 ≤M < 2,
(1−(1−q)K)
q M ≥ 2,
where q , (M−2)/(M+N−2). Moreover, when compared to the privately achievable rate of the centralized scheme RC(M)
as given in Theorem 1, we have
RD(M)
RC(M)
≤ 6
for M ≥ 1 when N ≥ K and for M ≥ 5/2 when N < K.
Note that the above result together with Theorem 3 implies the order-optimality of the decentralized private caching scheme
in the above regimes.
IV. ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME
In this section, we first discuss achievability schemes for some example setups, and then present our generalized achievability
scheme.
A. Examples
1) Optimal Scheme for N = K = 2 and M = 1: Figure 2 shows an example setup with N = 2 files and K = 2 users with
normalized cache memory size M = 1. Partition the two files W1,W2 into two equal parts W 11 ,W
2
1 and W
1
2 ,W
2
2 respectively.
Two independent and uniformly distributed random keys, T1 and T2 each of size F/2 bits, are generated. During the placement
phase, the random keys and their combination with the file parts are put in the caches as shown in Figure 2. During the delivery
phase, if the demand vector is (d1, d2) = (1, 2), the server transmits W 21 ⊕T1 and W 12 ⊕T2, of total size F bits. It can be easily
verified that both the users can recover their requested files using their respective cache contents and the server transmission.
Furthermore, neither user can derive any information about the file they did not request. Similarly, any other demand vector
can also be privately satisfied using a server transmission of size F bits. Specifically, note that when the users demand the
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Fig. 3. Alternate scheme for N = K = 2, M = 1 achieving rate RC = 2. Shown is the server transmission for demand vector (d1, d2) = (1, 2).
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Fig. 4. Alternate scheme for N = K = 2, M = N(K − 1) = 2 achieving rate RC = 1. Server transmission for the demand vector (d1, d2) = (1, 2) is
shown.
same file, the server may send it in the clear. Thus, the memory-rate pair (M = 1, R = 1) is achievable. As mentioned before,
M ≥ 1, R ≥ 1 are necessary conditions for feasibility in our setup and so the scheme presented above is in fact optimal.
While the scheme described above is optimal, it is not immediately clear how to generalize it to larger number of files and
caches. Instead, below we discuss a sub-optimal scheme at two different memory-rate points. This scheme easily generalizes
to our order-optimal scheme.
2) A Scheme for M = 1: At M = 1, we cache independent keys Ti of size F bits at each user i ∈ [K], see Figure 3 for an
illustration when N = K = 2. During delivery, the server transmits Wdi ⊕ Ti for each user i ∈ [K], resulting in a rate of K.
It is easy to verify that each user is able to recover its requested file and obtains no information about the other files. Finally,
note that the rate of this scheme matches the value of RC(1) = K (corresponding to M = 1) in Theorem 1.
3) A Scheme for M = N(K − 1): At the other extreme when M = N(K − 1), we use a secret sharing scheme [17], [6]
as defined below1:
Definition 2. For m < n, by an (m,n) secret sharing scheme, we mean a “scheme” pS1,...,Sn|W to generate n equal-sized
shares S1, . . . , Sn of a uniformly distributed secret W such that any m shares do not reveal any information about the secret
1Note that our terminology is non-standard compared to the literature where an (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme has n shares such that any t shares
do not reveal any information about the secret and the secret can be reconstructed from any t+ 1 shares.
8and access to all the n shares completely reveals the secret. i.e.,
I(W ;SA) = 0, ∀A ⊂ [n] s.t. |A| = m,
H(W |S[n]) = 0.
For such a scheme, the shares must have a size of at least log |W|n−m bits, where W is the alphabet of the secret. This is easy
to see by noting that the first m shares must not reveal any information about the secret, i.e., I(W ;S1, . . . , Sm) = 0, and the
secret can be completely reconstructed from all the shares taken together, i.e., I(W ;S1, . . . , Sn) = H(W ) = log |W|. Hence,
using the chain rule of mutual information in the second step below,
log |W| = I(W ;S1, . . . , Sn)
= I(W ;S1, . . . , Sm) + I(W ;Sm+1, . . . , Sn|S1, . . . , Sm)
= I(W ;Sm+1, . . . , Sn|S1, . . . , Sm)
≤ H(Sm+1, . . . , Sn|S1, . . . , Sm)
≤ H(Sm+1, . . . , Sn)
≤ (n−m) log |S|,
where S is the alphabet of each share and, hence, the size of each share in bits is log |S|. Above, we used the fact that
I(W ;S1, . . . , Sm) = 0 in the third step and the fact that conditioning cannot lead to an increase in entropy in the next step.
The last step follows from the fact that the uniform distribution maximizes entropy for a given alphabet. Hence, the shares
must have a size of at least log |W|n−m bits, where W is the alphabet of the secret. This bound is in fact tight. When |W| is large
enough, secret sharing schemes which achieve this bound exist [6]2.
For each file Wi, i ∈ [N ], we use a (K − 1,K) secret sharing scheme, which provides K shares, each of size F bits and
denoted by {Sji }Kj=1, with the following properties:
(i) No collection of K − 1 shares reveals any information about the file Wi, and
(ii) the file Wi can be recovered from its K shares {Sji }Kj=1.
During the placement phase, different shares are stored in the various caches as follows: the contents of cache k ∈ [K] is
given by Zk = {Sji : i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [K], j 6= k}. Note that there are N(K − 1) shares stored in every cache, each of size
2Alternatively, we can view this as a secure network coding problem [5], specifically, a form of wiretap channel of type II [12][14, Section VI.A], where
there are n equal capacity parallel links from the source to destination and there is a wiretapper who can eavesdrop on any m of these links. The results
in [5] imply that, the secure capacity of this network is n−m and codes which achieve this capacity exist for sufficiently large alphabet sizes.
9F bits, and this agrees with the normalized cache memory size M = N(K − 1). Next, during the delivery phase, each user
requests a file and the server transmits ⊕k∈[K]Skdk of size F bits, resulting in a rate of 1.
Since each user k ∈ [K] already has all the shares {Sji }i∈[N ],j 6=k, the missing share of the demanded file Skdk can be
obtained, and the file Wdk can be reconstructed. Furthermore for any other file than the one requested, each user k ∈ [K]
only has (K − 1) shares which do not reveal any information because of the properties of the (K − 1,K) secret sharing
scheme. Again, note that the rate of the proposed scheme agrees with the value of RC(M = N(K − 1)) = 1 in Theorem 1.
See Figure 4 for an illustration when N = K = 2. Here the K = 2 shares for each file Wi are given by S1i = Wi ⊕ Ti and
S2i = Ti, where Ti is a random key of size F bits.
B. Generalized Achievability Scheme
We now generalize the ideas presented above to obtain a private caching and delivery scheme for all problem parameters
N,K, and M , and characterize its rate to complete the proof of Theorem 1. In fact, we will propose an ( = 0, δ = 0)-private
scheme, i.e. the probability of error as well as the information leakage are both zero.
We have already discussed the schemes which achieve RC(M) as defined in Theorem 1 at M = 1 and M = N(K − 1).
Next, we consider M = Nt/(K − t) + 1 for some t ∈ {1, ...,K − 2}. We use a ((K−1t−1 ), (Kt )) secret sharing scheme to create(
K
t
)
shares, each of size Fs = F(Kt )−(K−1t−1 )
= Ft
(K−t)(K−1t−1 )
bits, for each file Wi, i ∈ [N ]. For each file Wi, we denote its shares
by Di , {SLi : L ⊂ [K], |L| = t} and define Cki , {SLi : L ⊂ [K], |L| = t, k ∈ L}. Then for any k ∈ [K], the shares
satisfy the following properties 3
I(W[N ];
⋃
i∈[N ]
Cki ) = 0, (7)
I(W[N ]\{dk};
⋃
i∈[N ]
Cki ∪Ddk) = 0, (8)
H(Wdk |Ddk) = 0. (9)
The identities (7), (8) imply that
(
K−1
t−1
)
shares of a file reveal no information about it and shares of one file do not provide
information about another file since they are independent; and (9) implies that
(
K
t
)
shares of a file are sufficient for recovering
it without error. During the placement phase, share SLi is placed in the cache of user k if k ∈ L. Thus
⋃
i∈[N ]C
k
i precisely
denotes the shares cached at user k. Since we have
(
K−1
t−1
)
shares of each of the N files in every user cache, the total memory
size in bits needed for storing the shares is given by
Fs ·N ·
(
K − 1
t− 1
)
=
Ft
(K − t)(K−1t−1 ) ·N ·
(
K − 1
t− 1
)
=
Nt · F
K − t . (10)
3We note that the properties detailed in (7), (8), and (9) do not require each file Wi to be uniformly distributed over [2F ], as long as they are all independent.
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Fig. 5. General scheme for N = K = 3 with t = 1,M = Nt/(K − t) + 1 = 5/2 achieving rate RC = 3/2. Server transmission for the demand vector
(d1, d2, d3) = (1, 2, 3) is shown.
In addition to the shares, for each subset V ⊂ [K] of users of size |V | = t + 1, an independently and uniformly generated
key TV of size Fs bits (indexed by the subset V ) is cached at each user k ∈ V . Since each user is part of exactly
(
K−1
t
)
such
subsets of size t+ 1, the cache memory in bits needed to store the keys is given by
Fs
(
K − 1
t
)
=
Ft
(K − t)(K−1t−1 ) ·
(
K − 1
t
)
= F. (11)
Combining (10) and (11), the total memory needed per cache is given by ( NtK−t +1)F bits which agrees with M = Nt/(K −
t) + 1. See Figure 5 for an illustration of the placement phase when N = K = 3 and t = 1.
During the delivery phase, the demand vector (d1, ..., dK) is revealed to the server and the users. Then for each V ⊂ [K]
such that |V | = t + 1, the server transmits TV ⊕k∈V SV \{k}dk on the shared link to the users. See Figure 5 for an example.
Consider one such subset V and its associated server transmission. From the placement phase, each k ∈ V has the key TV as
well as all the shares in the message except SV \{k}dk , and hence each user k can recover the share S
V \{k}
dk
. It is easy to verify
that at the end of the delivery phase, each user k would possess all the
(
K
t
)
shares of its requested file Wdk and thus, from
(9), can recover it without error. Furthermore, the scheme ensures that the server transmissions do not reveal any information
to a user about files it did not request. This combined with (7), (8) ensures that the information leakage, as defined in (2),
of the placement and delivery phases of the proposed scheme is zero. Thus, we have a private caching and delivery scheme.
Finally, the server transmission size in bits of our proposed scheme at M = Nt/(K − t) + 1 is given by(
K
t+ 1
)
· Fs =
(
K
t
)
t · F
(K − t)(K−1t−1 ) = KF1 + t .
Substituting t = (M − 1)K/(N +M − 1), we obtain the achievable rate expression RC(M) as defined in Theorem 1.
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Fig. 6. Illustration of the notation for the lower bound argument for N = K = 4 and corresponding to s = 2, k = 1 and l = 2 is shown. The demand
vectors in the two request instances are given by (d11 = 1, d
1
2 = 2) and (d
2
1 = 3, d
2
2 = 4) respectively. Here Ŵ = (W1,W2,W4), Ẑ = Z2, X̂ = X1, and
the resulting bound is R?P (M) ≥ 3−M .
V. LOWER BOUND AND ORDER-OPTIMALITY
In this section, we provide a lower bound on the optimal server transmission rate R?P (M), as defined in (3). Our proof
follows along similar lines as [10], [15], adapted suitably to further take into account the privacy constraint at the users.
Consider a tuple (M,R) which is privately achievable. Fix s ∈ [min{N/2,K}] and consider users 1, 2 . . . , s. Suppose user
i ∈ [s] requests file i. Since the tuple (M,R) is privately achievable, for any  > 0, there exists a private placement and
delivery scheme such that each user i can recover its requested file with a server transmission of rate R along with its cache
content Zi with probability of error at most . Furthermore for any δ > 0, the information leakage to any user about a file
other than the one it had requested is at most δ. Next, consider another scenario where each user i ∈ [s] requests file s + i.
Again, since the tuple (R,M) is privately achievable, the recovery and privacy conditions still hold true.
One can repeat the same argument for bN/sc different request patterns. Let Xl denote the server transmission corresponding
to the lth request instance when the demand pattern is given by (dl1 = (l − 1)s + 1, dl2 = (l − 1)s + 2, . . . , dls = ls). Define
X[bN/sc] , (Xi : i ∈ [bN/sc]) and recall that Z[s] = (Zi : i ∈ [s]),W[sbN/sc] = (Wi : i ∈ [sbN/sc]). Also, given some
k ∈ [K], let Ŵ ,W[sbN/sc]\{dlk} = W[sbN/sc]\{(l−1)s+k}, X̂ , X[bN/sc]\{l} and Ẑ , Z[s]\{k}. In words, Ŵ denotes the
vector of all demanded files except the one requested by the user k in the lth request instance, X̂ denotes the vector of server
transmissions in all the request instances except the lth one, and Ẑ refers to the contents of all the user caches except the kth
one. This construction is illustrated in Figure 6.
Then, from the recovery and privacy conditions, for (M,R) to be privately achievable, for l ∈ [bN/sc], k ∈ [s], we have
12
using Fano’s inequality in (1) and using (2)
H(W[sbN/sc]|X[bN/sc],Z[s]) ≤ Hb() + NF (12)
I(Ŵ;Xl, Zk) ≤ δ (13)
where for any x ∈ [0, 1], Hb(x) is the binary entropy function. Then, we have
(sbN/sc − 1)F = H(Ŵ)
= I(Ŵ;X[bN/sc],Z[s]) +H(Ŵ | X[bN/sc],Z[s])
(a)
≤ I(Ŵ;X[bN/sc],Z[s]) +Hb() + NF
= I(Ŵ;Xl, Zk) + I(Ŵ; X̂, Ẑ | Xl, Zk) +Hb() + NF
(b)
≤ I(Ŵ; X̂, Ẑ|Xl, Zk) +Hb() + NF + δ
≤ H(X̂, Ẑ) +Hb() + NF + δ
≤
bN/sc∑
i=1,i6=l
H(Xi) +
s∑
j=1,j 6=k
H(Zj) +Hb() + NF + δ
≤ (bN/sc − 1)R?P (M)F + (s− 1)MF +Hb() + NF + δ
where (a), (b) follow from (12), (13) respectively. Rearranging the terms, we get
R?P (M) ≥
sbN/sc − 1− (s− 1)M − (Hb() + NF + δ)/F
bN/sc − 1 .
The statement of Theorem 2 then follows by noting that the above inequality holds true for any s ∈ {1, 2, ...,min{N/2,K}}
and by choosing , δ to be arbitrarily small.
We now show that the achievable rate RC(M) from Theorem 1 is within a constant factor with the above information
theoretic lower bound. In particular, we prove Theorem 3, the details of which may be found in Appendix A. Theorem 3 states
that for M ≥ 1 + max{ N(K−N)(N−1)K+N , 0},
RC(M)
R?P (M)
≤ 16.
In this context, with regards to the condition on M , first note that M ≥ 1 is necessary for privacy. For N < K, the additional
memory requirement of N(K−N)(N−1)K+N appears since our proof of order-optimality for this case works when the achievable rate
RC ≤ min{N,K} = N . From Theorem 1, it is easy to verify that this requirement is satisfied only when M ≥ 1+ N(K−N)(N−1)K+N .
In particular, RC(M = 1) = K > N .
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VI. DECENTRALIZED SCHEME
The private coded caching scheme discussed in Section IV requires prior knowledge of the number of users K, during the
placement phase. This is a disadvantage and our proposed scheme becomes inapplicable if users choose to leave or seek to join
the system before the delivery phase. With this motivation, we briefly discuss a randomized, decentralized variant of our earlier
centralized scheme, wherein the placement phase is carried out at each user independently of the other users. The scheme is
inspired by the ideas presented in [11]. We further show that this scheme, while being decentralized, is still order-optimal
with respect to the information-theoretic lower bound.
As mentioned before, [15] studied the problem of secure coded caching, where the goal is to protect information about the
files from an adversary who eavesdrops on the server transmissions. The authors of this paper also presented a decentralized
scheme for this problem. However, the scheme presented there employed a centralized key placement phase which required the
knowledge of the total number of users and the content cached at each user in the placement phase. In contrast, the scheme we
propose has a decentralized key placement phase as well. Employing such a decentralized key placement entails an additive
penalty in terms of the expected rate, which is shown to vanish as the file size F goes to ∞.
We now present the details of our decentralized scheme. In the placement phase, a ‘private’ key Ci of size F bits is placed
at each user i ∈ [K]. This consumes F bits at each user. Additionally, if M ≥ 2, for each file Wi, i ∈ [n], we generate G ∈ N
shares, denoted by Di. These shares are such that the file Wi can be reconstructed using Di, but any subset of qG shares4
from Di provide no information about the file Wi, where
q , (M − 2)/(M +N + r − 2).
and r is a small positive constant. Let h denote the size of each share. By working with a large enough F , we can obtain a
share size of (approximately) h = F/(G− qG) bits and thus
Gh = F/(1− q).
Then for each user k ∈ [K] and for each file Wi, i ∈ [n], we independently pick a subset of qG shares from Di uniformly at
random and cache them at user k. Next, we generate a collection of G · ((1− q)/q+ r) independent keys U, where each key
is of size h bits. Then for each user k ∈ [K], we independently pick a subset of ((1− q) + rq) ·G keys from U uniformly at
4We ignore the integrality constraint in this section for ease of exposition. We can approximate the rates shown as closely as desired by choosing a large
enough file size F .
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random and cache them at user k. We refer to these keys as ‘shared’ keys. Thus, after placement, if M ≥ 2, the total memory
used at each cache in bits is given by
qG · h ·N + ((1− q) + rq)G · h+ F = (q(N + r) + 1− q) ·Gh+ F
= (q(N + r) + 1− q) · F/(1− q) + F
= (q(N + r)/(1− q) + 2) · F
=
(
(M − 2)(N + r)/(M +N + r − 2)
(N + r)/(M +N + r − 2) + 2
)
· F
=MF.
If 1 < M < 2, the memory at each cache is used only for storing a private key, which occupies F bits. Thus in either case,
the memory constraint is satisfied at each cache.
For any subset of users S ⊆ [K] and any file Wi, let GSi denote the shares of file Wi that are cached5 exclusively at all
the users in this subset S, i.e., these shares are cached at each user in S and not cached at any user in [K] \ S. It is easy to
verify that E[|GSi |] = q|S|(1 − q)(K−|S|)G. Similarly, let US denote the set of shared keys cached exclusively in the subset
S, then E[|US |] = q|S|(1− q)(K−|S|) ((1− q)/q + r)G. Here we also note that
E[|US | − |GS\kdk |] = q|S|(1− q)(K−|S|)rG. (14)
During the delivery phase, the users reveal the demand vector (d1, d2, ..., dK) to the server. If 1 ≤M ≤ 2, the server simply
transmits K vector sums, Wdk ⊕Ck, k ∈ [K]. Recall that Ci’s are the private keys stored in each cache. In this case, the rate
RD(M) = K.
In the analysis that follows, we assume M > 2. Let Q denote the event that the following condition is satisfied
|US | ≥ max
k∈S
|GS\kdk |, (15)
for each non-empty subset S ⊆ [K]. If Q occurs, then for every non-empty subset S ⊆ [K], the server transmits a vector sum6
of file shares encrypted with the corresponding shared key as
(
⊕k∈SGS\kdk
)
⊕US . For each subset S, this allows every user
k ∈ S to recover GS\kdk since it has access to US and G
S\j
dj
for all j ∈ S \ k. Thus, from the various server transmissions,
each user k gains access to all the shares of its requested file Wdk which enables its reconstruction. If Q does not occur, the
server transmits K vector sums, Wdk ⊕ Ck, k ∈ [K]. Since each user k ∈ [K] already has the private key Ck, it can recover
the requested file Wdk .
5Gφi refers to those shares which are not cached at any user.
6We zero pad the vectors GS\kdk before summing so that they are all of the same size, namely, |U
S |.
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We now argue that our privacy condition (2) is satisfied by the proposed scheme. The placement phase provides a user with
no more than qG shares of any file, so no information about the files is leaked during this phase. First, consider the case when
the condition for event Q (15) is satisfied. Recall that in this case, for each non-empty subset S ⊆ [K], the server transmits
an encrypted sum of shares
(
⊕k∈SGS\kdk
)
⊕US . The occurrence of event Q implies that for each subset S ⊆ [K], the sizes
of the shared keys satisfy |US | ≥ maxk∈S |GS\kdk |. Thus, each user obtains access only to the shares of its requested file Wdk
in the delivery phase, and no new information about the shares of other files is revealed. Next, consider the case when Q does
not occur. In this case, the server transmits Wdk ⊕ Ck for each k ∈ [K]. Since the private key Ck is present only at user k,
our privacy condition (2) holds.
We now show a lower bound on P[Q]. For this, define p , q|S|(1− q)(K−|S|) so that (14) becomes
E[|US | − |GS\kdk |] = p · rG. (16)
The following can also be easily shown
Var[|GS\kdk |] ≤ p(1− q)/q ·G , (17)
Var[|US |] ≤ p ((1− q)/q + r)G . (18)
Then, we have
P(|US | < |GS\kdk |) = P(|US | − |G
S\k
dk
| − p · rG < −p · rG)
≤ P(||US | − |GS\kdk | − p · rG| > p · rG)
(a)
≤ Var[|U
S | − |GS\kdk |]
p2r2G2
(b)
=
(
Var[|US |] + Var[|GS\kdk |]
)
p2r2G2
(c)
≤ (p((1− q)/q + r)G+ p(1− q)/q ·G)
p2r2G2
=
(2(1− q)/q + r)
pr2G
=
(2(1− q)/q + r)
q|S|(1− q)K−|S|r2G,
where (a) follows from (16) and Chebyshev’s inequality; and (b) follows from the fact that |US | and |GS\kdk | are independent.
Finally, (c) is obtained by plugging in (17), (18). Applying the union bound over all k ∈ S and S ⊆ [K], we thus have
P[Q] ≥ 1−
K∑
j=1
(
K
j
)
j · (2(1− q)/q + r)
qj(1− q)K−jr2G
= 1− K(2(1− q)/q + r)
qK(1− q)K−1r2G . (19)
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Now the expected server transmission rate E[RD(M)] can be bounded by first considering whether or not Q occurs and then
by going over all non-empty subsets S ⊆ [K]. It is given by
E[RD(M)]F = P[Q]
∑
S⊆K,S 6=φ
E[(|US |)|Q]h+ (1− P[Q])KF
(a)
≤
∑
S⊆K,S 6=φ
E[|US |]h+ (1− P[Q])KF
(b)
=
K∑
j=1
(
K
j
)
qj(1− q)K−j ((1− q)/q + r)Gh+ (1− P[Q])KF
(c)
≤ Gh(1− (1− q)K) ((1− q)/q + r) + K(2(1− q)/q + r)
qK(1− q)K−1r2G ·KF
= F
(
(1− (1− q)K)
(
1
q
+
r
1− q
)
+
K2(2(1− q)/q + r)
qK(1− q)K−1r2G
)
where (a) follows since for any random variable X ≥ 0 and event Y , E[X] = P[Y]E[X|Y] + P[Y]E[X|Y] ≥ P[Y]E[X|Y],
(b) follows since E[|US |] = q|S|(1− q)(K−|S|)((1− q)/q + r)G and (c) follows from (19). Since r can be chosen to be any
small positive constant, by letting the file size F and the number of shares G grow large, E[RD(M)] can be made arbitrarily
close to
E[RD(M)] =
(1− (1− q′)K)
q′
, (20)
where q′ = (M − 2)/(M + N − 2). Further, by the law of large numbers, the server transmission rate RD(M) approaches
E[RD(M)] (almost surely) as file size goes to ∞. The requirement of large file size for this convergence is similar in spirit
to the other works on decentralized caching [11], [15]. This completes the description of the decentralized version of our
proposed private coded caching scheme.
In Figure 7, RD(M) is plotted against the centralized rate, RC(M) in Theorem 1 and the cut-set lower bound in Theorem 2.
In the plot we see that the decentralized rate is very ‘close’ to the centralized rate for a large range of memory sizes. We now
quantify this gap.
We first show that for M ≥ 2,
RD(M)/RC(M − 1) ≤ 2.
Note that for M ≥ 2, RC(M − 1) can be re-written as RC(M − 1) = 1/
(
q′ + 1K
)
. Thus, we have RD(M)/RC(M − 1) =(
1 + 1Kq′
)
(1− (1− q′)K). Then, consider the following cases:
Case 1: Kq′ ≥ 1. In this case (
1 +
1
Kq′
)
(1− (1− q′)K) ≤ 1 + 1
Kq′
≤ 2,
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Fig. 7. The plot shows the achievable rates and the converse for a setup with N = 25 files and K = 15 users. The dashed red line is the decentralized rate,
RD(M). The solid blue line is the rate obtained with the earlier centralized scheme, RC(M). The dash-dot black line is the cut-set lower bound.
Case 2: Kq′ < 1. Here (
1 +
1
Kq′
)
(1− (1− q′)K) ≤
(
1 +
1
Kq′
)
Kq′ = Kq′ + 1 ≤ 2
and this proves our result.
Moreover it can be easily verified that for N ≥ K, M ≥ 2 and for N < K, M ≥ 5/2,
RC(M − 1)
RC(M)
≤ N + (K + 1)(M − 1)
N + (K + 1)(M − 2) ≤ 3.
Using this and the fact that for 1 ≤M ≤ 2, RD(M) is constant, we have for N ≥ K, M ≥ 1 and N < K, M ≥ 5/2,
RD(M)/RC(M) ≤ 6.
Since in both the above regimes, N ≥ K, M ≥ 1 and N < K, M ≥ 5/2, RC(M)/R?P (M) ≤ 16 from Theorem 3,
order-optimality of our decentralized coded caching scheme is thus proven.
VII. DISCUSSION
As mentioned before, the work closest to ours is [15], which studied the optimal server transmission rates needed to keep
the files secure from an eavesdropper listening to the transmissions on the shared link. In contrast, we imposed the privacy
requirement that users should not be able to learn about files they did not request. An obvious scenario of interest is when
both the conditions, security against an eavesdropper and privacy against users have to be satisfied. Let R?PE(M) denote the
optimal server transmission rate in such a setup, as a function of the normalized cache size M .
18
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Cache Memory at each User (M) 
  
  
No Security 
Eavesdropper Security 
Eavesdropper Security and User Privacy 
Fig. 8. The plot shows the achievable rates for a setup with N = 15 files and K = 10 users under various conditions. The dashed red line is the achievable
rate with no security obtained in [10]. The dash-dot black line is the achievable rate with only eavesdropper security achieved in [15]. The solid blue line is
our achievable rate RC(M) with eavesdropper security and privacy.
As an example, recall the setup in Figure 2 with N = K = 2 and M = 1 for which the minimum rate for a private scheme
is given by R?P (M = 1) = 1. Under the optimal scheme illustrated in Figure 2, when both users request say file W1, the
server simply transmits W1 on the shared link. While this sufficed for satisfying the user privacy constraints, clearly it will not
work in the presence of an eavesdropper. In fact, the memory-rate tuple (M = 1, R = 1) is not feasible if we insist on both
privacy against users and security against the eavesdropper. The optimal server transmission rate in this scenario is given by
R?PE(M) = 3−M for 1 ≤M ≤ 2. Proof of this involves certain non-cut set based ideas along the lines of [10, Appendix].
While the optimal scheme in the above example did not protect against eavesdroppers, the general achievability scheme
proposed in Section IV does in fact have this additional property since each server transmission to a subset V of users is
protected using a key7 TV . Thus, an eavesdropper who has access to these transmissions can obtain no information about
the files. This implies that the rate function RC(M) as defined in (4) is in fact achievable for the setup with both security
and privacy constraints, i.e. R?PE(M) ≤ RC(M). Furthermore, it is easy to see that the lower bounds in Theorem 2 and the
order-optimality result in Theorem 3 also continue to hold. Thus, the transmission rate for our proposed scheme is still within
a constant factor of the optimal when both security and privacy conditions are imposed.
Figure 8 plots the order-optimal transmission rates under various constraints. Note that when either no constraint or only the
security against eavesdropper constraint is imposed, the achievable rate is zero at M = N . On the other hand, once the user
7Strictly speaking, this is not true for the scheme at the extreme memory point M = N(K−1) since we do not use a key to protect the server transmission.
However, this can be easily fixed without affecting order-optimality by additionally storing a common key in each cache and securing the server transmission
with this key.
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privacy condition is activated, the minimum achievable rate for any value of M is one. Furthermore, as the figure illustrates,
the gap between the rate with no security and the rate with security against an eavesdropper is not very large. This was in
fact shown to be at most a constant factor in [15]. The same continues to hold for a large memory regime, 1 < M < N K−12K ,
when a further user privacy constraint is also added.
APPENDIX A
In this section, we provide details of proof of Theorem 3. We first define MS ,M − 1. Then using N/s− 1 ≤ bN/sc and
MS =M − 1 in Theorem 2, we have
R?P (M) ≥ max
s∈{1,2,...,min{N/2,K}}
s−MS s(s− 1)
N − 2s . (21)
Also, the achievable rate expression RC(M) may be written as
RC(M) =
K
1 +KMS/(N +MS)
.
For values of M in our range of interest, if K ≤ N ,
RC(M) =
K
1 +KMS/(N +MS)
≤ K.
On the other hand, if K > N ,
RC(M) ≤ RC
(
N(K −N)
(K + 1)N −K
)
= N. (22)
Thus, we have RC(M) ≤ min{N,K}.
Case 1: min{N,K} ≤ 16.
In this case,
RC(M) ≤ min{N,K} ≤ 16.
And since R?P (M) ≥ 1,
RC(M)
R?P (M)
≤ 16.
Case 2: min{N,K} > 16.
In this case we consider 3 regions based on the values of MS .
Region I: 0 ≤MS < max{N,K}/(K − 1).
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Let s = b0.205min{N,K}c in (21), using8 which we obtain
R?P (M) ≥ s−MS
s(s− 1)
N − 2s
≥ b0.205min{N,K}c −MS b0.205min{N,K}c(b0.205min{N,K}c − 1)
N − 2b0.205min{N,K}c
≥ min{N,K}
(
0.205− 1
min{N,K} −
0.205(0.205min{N,K} − 1)(max{N,K}K−1 )
N − 2 ∗ 0.205min{N,K}
)
. (23)
Now consider the expression max{N,K}(0.205min{N,K} − 1)/(K − 1). If N < K,
max{N,K}0.205min{N,K} − 1
K − 1 = K
0.205N − 1
K − 1
≤ 0.205N(16/15).
And if N ≥ K,
max{N,K}0.205min{N,K} − 1
K − 1 = N
0.205K − 1
K − 1
≤ 0.205N
≤ 0.205N(16/15).
Plugging this into (23) we get
R?P (M) ≥ min{N,K}
(
0.205− 1
min{N,K} −
16
15
0.2052
1− 2 ∗ 0.205min{N,K}N
)
≥ min{N,K}
(
0.205− 1
16
− 16
15
0.2052
1− 2 ∗ 0.205
)
≥ min{N,K}/16.
This gives
RC(M)
R?P (M)
≤ 16.
Region II: max{N,K}/(K − 1) ≤MS < N/15.
In this region, note that
1/MS ≥ (K − 1)/max{N,K} (24)
and that
MS < N/15⇒ N
N +MS
≥ 15
16
. (25)
8s ≥ 1 holds if min{N,K} ≥ 5. This assumption is however, not critical for our analysis.
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Now,
RC(M) =
K
1 +KMS/(N +MS)
≤ K
KMS/(N +MS)
≤ N +MS
MS
.
Letting s = b0.198N+MSMS c in (21) and following9 steps similar to the one used to get (23) we have
R?P (M) ≥
N +MS
MS
(
0.198− MS
N +MS
− 0.198
2
N/(N +MS)− 2 ∗ 0.198/MS
)
.
Using (24) and (25) in the above inequality, we get
R?P (M) ≥
N +MS
MS
(
0.198− 1
16
− 0.198
2
15/16− 2 ∗ 0.198
)
≥ N +MS
MS
1
16
.
Hence,
RC(M)
R?P (M)
≤ 16.
Region III: N/15 ≤MS .
Note that N/15 ≤MS ⇒ (N +MS)/16 ≤MS , using which
RC(M) =
K
1 +K MSN+MS
≤ K
1 +K 116
≤ 16.
Using R?P (M) ≥ 1 with the above inequality, we get
RC(M)
R?P (M)
≤ 16.
This proves Theorem 3.
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